Don Rich's Open Salon Blog

The Important Lesson From Operation Cobra II for Syria

Fri, 17 May 2013 17:05:09 -0400

For MEB, forever.

When a newspaper article appears in USA Today having Air Force officials off the record discuss the possibility of taking down a country's air defense system, Syria of course being the country, that is a non-trivial signal.

Of course, having a large Russian naval deployment at Tartus, Syria, and deploying the S-300 anti-air defense system is a strong signal too. On the other hand, if Russia needs to know he can't defeat American air attacks for sure... that is what it is as to a live fire exercise so to speak.

As to that article about the United States talking about cyber attacks to take down Syrian air defenses, it is true that Israel used cyber modes of attack, if only in the sense of preparation for traditional airstrikes.

If we take down the Syrian integrated air defense communication links, their system will be less effective, and markedly so, but you still have to fly planes to bomb both the air defense missiles and the targets that one would wish to destroy afterwards.

At a minimum, the article was a psychological operation, psyop, to influence the regime, which by its public nature means that there is more American committment to achieving an objective in Syria that it is believed in elite circles requires at least the credible threat of the use of force.

Since Syria bears some similarities to Iraq demographically and politically, that means the experience from Iraq, and the invasion of said country in Operation Cobra II are important.

The lesson is that given the history, one had better be prepared for stabilization operations after launching such a thing, whoever it is that does that as to the "boots on the ground" question, in the case of Syria, possibly Egypt and Turkey, if presumably Qatar and other Sunni would be paying the bills.

The utility of looking back in history is because if you look at the key issue in Iraq after April 9, 2003 and the fall of Baghdad, it was the emergence of what was a bad latent problem: Sunni-Shia sectarianism.

Substitute Alawi for Shia and Sunni Baath Party dominance in Iraq for Alawi Baath Party dominance in Syria, and if the latter is overstated more than likely, as was the case in Iraq to a point, one has the same issue.

It has become fashionable lately to blame that on the United States, see Mir Rosen for example.

However, his own work shows that the Badr militias and Sadrists of Muqtada al Sadr were in fact ready to go the second Saddam's goose looked cooked.

On the other hand, the light footprint of Cobra II and also the manner of chosing Iraqi allies on the primary basis of sectarian alignment probably did contribute to what became if not Lebanon in the seventies a fairly nightmarish situation nonetheless.

The United States was lucky to leave Iraq in relatively good order, even as it probably left too early, and in fact is dangerously close to needing to go back to prevent what is at risk in Syria now as well: a sectarian bloodbath, except potentially with WMD.

Whatever people are thinking about taking out air defenses in terms of presumably no-fly zones is great, just remember that the lesson of Cobra II is go large on the ground to keep the parties from exacting revenge.

finis

Obama's IRS Issue on a Scale of 1-10: Fixable Seven?

Thu, 16 May 2013 13:05:01 -0400

For MEB, forever.

There is no reason to believe that the President had any knowledge of the actions of the Ohio IRS office in question, although nonetheless, on a scale of 1-10 as to problems, it is somewhat serious, a seven, if fixable.

If that were the case, that he had knowledge, it would be a grave matter indeed, if most politicians know how to keep their hands clean of such things.

It is a serious issue both as a generic matter, and as a matter of practical politics, if the latter is fixable, if there will be damage that cannot be fixed.

As to the former generic question, any time there is even a perception that the IRS is not acting in a politically neutral fashion, it raises spectres of something even most Republicans didn't like about Nixon, and undermines confidence in the government in general.

As to that broader point, Americans comply with tax laws voluntarily in the main in a comparative sense; to undermine that is bad for everyone, unless you want to be Greece, with 30-40 per cent under-collection.

Once that starts, you can't easily fix it; hence it being a seven.

As to the more narrow analogy, with Nixon, it probably won't rise to that level, if episode did harm, especially if you are old enough or have read enough to remember certain things.

To be fair to Nixon, he was at war with a Communist state attempting to defeat an American ally in the context of the Communist aggressors of North Vietnam being assisted in such efforts by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Nixon to be fair thought the American Left at best dangerously naive as to the consequences of a North Vietnamese victory, at worst rooting for the victory of Communism.

In that context, if he shouldn't have used the IRS to harass his opponents, there were political consequences at stake beyond mere partisanship, even as to introduce such tactics endangered a vital part of what it was we were trying to defeat in Communist subversion and aggression: rule of law.

As to the Obama case, we are at war with Muslim fundamentalists of a certain stripe, if not all Muslim fundamentalists.

The murder of six American soldiers in Afghanistan is a reminder of that fact.

When people start talking of secession and nullification in certain regions of the country, it can hardly be a surprise that they make some people very, very uncomfortable, even as there is and always must be a debate about the role of the Federal government versus the Several States, and the role of the United States overseas.

But, that is why we have free speech, so as both Justices Brandeis and Holmes said, things we don't like can be combatted with more speech, even as allowing unlimited political expenditures in practice might privilege some arguments in a way that everyone would regret (like cutting the Defense budget by 2/3s as some Libertarians wish to do, if not all).

But as to the level of damage of this matter, it is serious, partly because Tea Party people are already so suspicious of the Federal government in the first place.

As someone who has had Progs do rather nasty things to over the years when there was a policy disagreement, one can sympathize to a point with that view.

At the same time, when one has disagreed with Right wing people, one found similar unpleasantness, if in neither case, knock wood, with the IRS.

That right there is why the matter matters symbolically, even as it wasn't what Nixon did, as to auditing people and such who opposed his views. That was a 10.

Nonetheless, given the gravity of the damaging the vital to tax revenue, and therefore national defense function, of the IRS, severe measures were bound to be needed with those who violated public trust, even if one could see their possible point of view that allowing unlimited donations to political causes was not likely to serve the long run interests of a Republic and/or Democracy.

Correctible, but a seven, and not something that can be repeated much more, or sharks smell blood.

finis

Bashar Al As(s)ad I: Reluctant Heir

Tue, 14 May 2013 17:05:15 -0400

For MEB, forever.

Asad with one S is the correct spelling, although in Levantine Arabic pronunciation, double S works too.

That's also like arguing over spelling Qadhafi, Q or G, although there is a lesson there in a different way, as to the difficulty of passing along a family business.

Saif didn't get to inherit, nor did Gemal.

Bashar did inherit Hafiz's creation of the Baathist dictatorship, founded as the family business in 1971, if curiously so, very much by accident; hence the title "reluctant heir."

As to the reluctant heir, Bashar was preceeded by Basil, the latter always assumed to be Hafiz' heir.

As the second son, Bashar did what many Jewish and Arab families (according to Mossad's analysis) have their sons do in the region, which is not to take over the family business, but enter a learned profession.

That adds to the tragicomic aspect of the whole Assad affair today, in which we have a Western residency-trained opthamologist standing accused of being a chemical weapons psycho-killer.

Perhaps that will be the Assad addendum to the Hippocratic Oath: thou shall not gas thy patients with chemical weapons?

In any event, by all accounts unlike the elder son Basil al Assad, Bashar went his quiet way through school, excelling his other siblings academically.

Like Saif Qadhafi and Gemal Mubarak, other heirs to power, Bashar was educated partly in the West, doing his residency in London, if under the temporal condition that he was merely an extra to the family business.

And then there was the 1994 car crash that killed Basil, supposedly racing around Damascus at night. One might wonder about that, although the main point would be that suddenly, younger brother Bashar was thrust into the potential role of successor.

After a year of mourning, quite sincere on Pere Assad's part for sure, Bashar was advanced to heir apparent, even though as part of a troika; "Our Leader, Our Ideal, Our Hope."

Human nature being what it is, one wonders if today, Bashar draws some very significant strength from the implicit second hand lion status of that above phrase, making the reluctant heir a more loyal son than would otherwise be the case, and therefore in effect more vulnerable as to not having made enough changes before the civil war started, but more formidable now, as to having a certain willingness to see things through to the end, to prove worthy, and people wrong about him being soft too.

finis

Syrian & Iraqi Turmoil,Clash of Civilizations & Sikes-Picot

Tue, 14 May 2013 15:05:58 -0400

Sikes-Picot refers to the 1916 agreement between Britain and France to divide the presumed carcass of the yet to be defeated Ottoman Empire.

That agreement, and its implementation, along with the Balfour Declaration gave us the Arab Middle East as we know it, minus Saudi Arabia (conquered independently by Ibn Saud).

Clash of Civilizations of course refers to Samuel Huntington's early 1990's work, predicting that once the Cold War ended, the main disputes in International Relations would not be ideology, but over cultural cleavages.

That prediction is looking a lot better lately, if a lot of people won't admit that, especially people who think they are cosmopolitian.

In any event, when looking at current events in the Middle East in Syria and Iraq in the context of Sikes-Picot and Clash of Civilizations, one can see an ugly possibility developing that probably is not in American interest, and does constitute a Realpolitik case for more assertion in Syria in particular.

That is because if Sikes-Picot were to unravel, Sunnis in Iraq and Syria would be seeking support from the Al Saud, while Shia-Alawi-Ismaili in the same countries would be seeking support from Iran: clash of Muslim Civilizations, fundamentally Arabs versus Persians.

On the other hand, a stand-down of the emerging Sunni-Shia Clash of Civilizations, would allow for more economic development/reconstruction one would think than the violent alternatives, and show an appreciation of the fact that if Sikes-Picot was hardly perfect, unzippering whole countries tends to be rather bloody.

That would be the Realpolitik case for a more assertive American policy in Syria (if you think that Humpty Dumpty isn't totally broke) and, there is a natural region of Syria, even without Lebanon-Jordan, at least by almost 100 years of experience now.

finis

Why It is Hard to Spy on Russia

Tue, 14 May 2013 14:05:47 -0400

v Oksana da link a, e schto v emenia. oichin xorosho.

An American was found to be conducting "activities inconsistent with his status as a diplomat" and is now about to be persona non-grata-ed back to D.C./Langley.

It could be either or, as sometimes, it's just a volunteer thing, or being volunteered one might argue too.

The whole episode does show why it ain't easy to spy on Ivan, which of course means our counter-intelligence CI people have to work that much harder.

The reason it is hard to spy on Ivan is that Ivan has a deep paranoic streak, since people have invaded Ivan, and because Ivan wishes to rule the world, like we and the Chinese and of course others too.

That's life.

Ivan has some advantages however, because Ivan's grim view of things relatively speaking means that he is more on the lookout for spies than we are, although our CI people work hard too.

As to the fundamental difficulty, if you are in Moscow in an Embassy, the good news if you get caught spying is that Ivan won't take you out to a deserted factory lot and do mean things to you if you don't tell him things. He might crash your car, or other things that will put you in the grave, but unlike the radiation therapy administered to someone, that's too much for a diplomat.

So, you're safe, to spy on Ivan like he spies on us.

That's the good news.

The bad news is that if you are a diplomat, you are suspicious already.

By definition you could be a spy, since you are an employee of the American government, and so you get watched.

Worse, they might use what is known as a dangle, to draw you out.

See, if I approach a Russian official in the FSB etc... Ivan's people might ask that target questions, hanging upside down etc... .

So, lots of people are what are called walk-ins, which is great, except that is a great way to bait people too, to find out who in fact is a spy in the first place.

So, good CI work might have been done by the Russian Federation, which only means that their American counterparts just have to do the same thing too, especially of course watching all the Russians who moved here after the Cold War allegedly ended, in case one per cent of them are in fact FSB etc... which would be like a small division.

Of course in wartime, we know what would happen, which is just life in the big city.

finis