During his swearing in speech, Muslim Brotherhood candidate and now President as long as he doens't step on the wrong toes Muhammad Morsi stated that he would work for the release of the Blind Sheikh, the one who helped organize the World Trade Tower bombings in 1993, raising the question of how much that should be a concern.
He said that in the context of lobbying for the release of detainees, to be fair, and said he would only ask on humanitarian grounds, as to why one shouldn't overreact to the statement, if that's once, like the story of the farmer and the mule.
He has domestic political constituencies he has to answer too, who don't like the detainees situation, possibly understandable, although there is the "repeat customer" problem those on the Left won't talk about as to the United States being the Big Bad Wolf of international politics.
The "repeat customer" problem is that about 20 per cent of those released get picked up again, although why we don't just quietly execute the repeat customers is a curious question: 9 mm. two to the chest, one to the head, problem solved, Sir.
As to the Blind Sheikh, although he spent a lot of time pleading for release from Egypt on human rights grounds so he could come to mosques to the United States and plead for fellow Muslims to kill fellow Americans, like at the first World Trade Center attack, all of whose members had ties to him, after which he tried to encourage people to blow up the tunnels in New York and suffocate tens of thousands of people, he is blind and he is a cleric, as to some feeling sympathy for him that blinds them to what he is: a terrorist organizer and propagandist who could have been executed.
Morsi to be fair has to please his constituents, and so letting that pass, if with a "that' once" private statement is probably expedient, if it's also a warning as to where his head is too.
Moreover, and more importantly, there is the situation in the Sinai and Gaza.
Last summer, there was a well-organized attack on the Israeli town of Eilat, of strategic importance because of the history of past wars having that as an object, e.g. the expulsion of U.N. peacekeepers in 1967 that if a bluff in fact by Nasser, thanks in turn to Russian provocations with respect to the Syrian-Israeli "bulldozer war" over Upper Gallilee.
That attack led to an Israeli reprisal strike that killed Egyptian policeman that in turn led to the sacking of the Israeli embassy in Cairo and the single worst deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli relations since Camp David.
In the Sinai, by all accounts the Bedouin tribes have grown more radicalized and prone to assist their fellow Arabs in Gaza.
Since Hamas is in fact an offshoot of the Brotherhood movement, and because one of the reasons Mubarak grew to be unpopular was the blockade of Gaza, one can predict that Morsi will be under presure to run risks even greater over that, which has several implications.
First, the Saud if they are wise will see that the reward to the United States for dealing with the Arab Spring somewhat on their terms has to be pressure that is efficacious on Hamas and Fatah to do a deal with Netanyahu, or this will all blow up in their face.
Putin's trip to the Middle East was a reminder that there exists another Great Power patron capable of arming people in the region.
Second, in order to prevent more clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces, there has to be contemplated a strengthening of American and Observer forces in the Sinai.
Some have suggested reaching an accord whereby Egypt deploys more troops, but that would seem to play into Israeli fears of the worst sort as to the long-running meaning of the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in Egypt, and also potentially somewhat if not totally in Syria.
More Americans and others would seem to have lower risks at same efficiency levels.
Third and lastly, Israel needs to see that it has limits to its control over events, the only one of which for sure is making an offer to the Palestinians that in diplomatic context, note Putin's visit, reaches a stabilizing accord.
So, Morsi asks for the blind sheikh, which is vexing, of the form, "that's once."
On the other hand, it also shows that we have things to offer too, should there be broader diplomatic accomplishments, that all of course serve the interests of securing Israel such as can be done.
finis


Salon.com
Comments
The Brotherhood never led a Sunni uprising in Syria again.
What's interesting is whether Egyptian Sunnis under the Brotherhood will try to export their revolution to Syria, and support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, in the way the French Jacobins did after 1789 in other regions.
Syria's Baathist party is actually run by a Shia minority (hence its support from Iran and Hezbollah). Perhaps this is why Turkey wants to intervene so much? The prospect of an Islamic Brotherhood bloc from Egypt up to Syria could cause even greater problems for regional stability?
It would be like the return of Nasser, albeit a more theocratic Nasserite ideology.
We want a Turkish style democracy in Syria after Assad, not a Muslim Brotherhood Democracy, no?
Hell, why not give all of Syria and Lebanon to Turkey?
You throw them into the mix, with their Turkish ethnic and Islamic Suffi/Sunni secularistic/pluralistic/cosmopolitan background and it destroys the plans for all the nasty little dogs in the region, who really can't destroy the Jannisaries, even if they wanted to.