In his materialist conception of history Karl Marx saw economic factors as the central, driving force that shaped society.  He dismissed as “idealistic humbug” the notion that political and economic organization are shaped by ideas, instead arguing the reverse, that ideas and consciousness develop from the existing material conditions of a given society. In his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, for example, Marx writes:

 “The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”

Hence, Marx points out that any given society’s political organization, social structure, religion, laws, and intellectual activity are driven by its existing material conditions, its modes of production, its economic organization.  This was a break from most traditional views of history, which tended to see human development as a long story of events shaped by important men and great ideas. Thus, in The German Ideology, Volume 1, Marx writes:

 “Already here we see . . . how nonsensical is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real (material and economic) relationships and confines itself to the high-sounding dramas of princes and states.”

            Marx’s insistence on analyzing history from a naturalistic standpoint was intellectually honest, as was his steadfast effort to consider human experience in its true, scientific totality.  Thus it is refreshing indeed when he embarks on his discussion of his materialist conception of history with these words:

“The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstractions can only be made in the imagination. . . These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.”

It is clear that Marx starts, appropriately, at the beginning when he continues:

"The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.  Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation with the rest of nature.”

Indeed, a naturalistic view of humanity would seem essential to any accurate understanding of history.  If one documents human events but views those events through the lenses of ingrained prejudices or false theology, one is likely to reach defective conclusions in interpreting history. It is common, for example, for a dominant society to view history as doing little more than legitimizing and proving that society’s own greatness. Such historical interpretations can be found in texts confirming the exceptionalism of the Roman, British, and American empires in their heydays (the latter still ongoing), to name just a few obvious examples.  Moreover, those chained to religious dogma are also likely to interpret all of history as validating the prophecies and holy texts of their theology, giving particular emphasis to people and events that are consistent with such views while being dismissive to opposing critiques and views.

        This makes Marx’s analysis especially welcome and refreshing, for it attempts to set aside all such prejudices in an effort to objectively and scientifically assess the history of human events.  When one fairly considers Marx, however, one quickly sees the difficulty of the naturalistic task that Marx set out to accomplish.  For even though Marx attempts to analyze history from a naturalistic viewpoint, he falls into several traps that reveal shortcomings in his analysis. 

One such shortcoming is Marx’s tendency toward what might be called “human exceptionalism.”  That is, any naturalistic consideration of human history would necessarily require a thorough analysis of the first fundamental fact about human existence – the fact that humans are animals.  As an animal species humans are defined by their biological characterizations, and any understanding of the human condition, including its history, starts with an understanding of the biological reality of human existence.  This biological reality is not just the physical reality of needing food, water and shelter, but also the biological reality of having a brain, and therefore a mind and psyche, that has developed via natural selection.  Thus the human animal, in even the strictest materialist analysis, carries with it psychological traits (the fight-or-flight instinct, the tendencies toward anxiety and depression, the craving for food and comfort beyond what is rationally needed, etc.) that have somehow had survival value for hundreds of thousands of years.  Marx, to his credit, attempts to incorporate natural humanity into his analysis, but for the most part he does little more than allude to the primitive, underlying biological nature of humans without incorporating a thorough commentary on that nature into his analysis.

In fact, any fair assessment would conclude that Marx actually downplays the animal nature of humanity, for when discussing the subject he falls into the common trap of quickly embarking on a discussion of what sets humans apart from other animals.  This is what I mean when I refer to the “human exceptionalism” – Marx does not wish to thoroughly consider how humans and other animals are alike, but rather he immediately wants to discuss what is unique about the human animal.  Thus, early in his materialist conception of history, we find Marx saying: 

“Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like.  They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a stop which is conditioned by their physical organization.  By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.”

Note first of all that the paradigm of human exceptionalism is clearly cemented into Marx’s mind, as is evidenced by his reference to humans being distinguished “from animals” (whereas “from other animals” would be more accurate). 

This quibble, however, is less important than the fact that Marx ignores 95 percent of human history when he refers to humans as “producing their means of subsistence,” when in fact humans have done so only very recently.  Homo sapiens have existed for at least 200,000 years and have spent the vast majority of that time hunting and gathering like other animals, discovering agriculture only in the last few thousand years. (And this doesn’t even consider the millions of years of pre-human history that our earlier ancestors, with their pre-human genes that we inherited, roamed the planet.)  Marx never mentions such facts, instead only occasionally alluding to primitive existence and tribal ownership. Showing his preference to deal with civilized humanity, rather than the natural human condition that gave rise to civilization, Marx focuses his analysis on “the relations of different nations” and similar commentary that, while insightful in its own sense, overlooks the animalistic realities underlying most of human history.

Fair consideration of the human animal as an animal, with its accompanying biological and psychological realities and the empirical realities that are incidental thereto, would no doubt lead one to question some aspects of Marx’s analysis.  For example, if we return to the fundamental principle put forward by Marx, that the material mode of production (i.e. economic organization) defines consciousness, thereby determining political and social organization, we might reconsider the precision of such a notion if we concede that consciousness is inevitably shaped also by complex evolutionary factors.  While surely economic factors weigh heavily in shaping modern human consciousness, in defining how and what the human animal thinks as well as how the animal organizes itself politically and socially, one cannot deny that economic factors do not act alone.  The insistence on consciousness being driven by a straight causal economic train makes Marx vulnerable to criticism.

It would almost seem absurd to suggest that Marx oversimplified anything, as he demonstrated in his writings time and again an eagerness to delve into complexity, but an argument can be made that his insistence on straight-line causation, placing the mode of production as the driving factor in shaping consciousness, was in fact flawed in its simplicity.  Consciousness, and the political, social, legal and religious structures that flow from it, are certainly shaped in large part by economic factors, but surely the true picture of causation would show a complex web, not a straight chain.  Consciousness, manifested sometimes by irrational impulses and desires, for example, does indeed shape economic realities, as we see time again when citizens demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice their economic interests on perceived moral or social grounds, or when they act irrationally as consumers in misusing credit or purchasing goods they don’t need.  To the extent human behavior is driven by irrationality, and I would argue that is a large extent indeed, we see consciousness not just as a caused phenomenon, but as a causal agent.  This statement is not intended as a comprehensive explanation of the causation issue, but one example of the innumerable complexities that Marx often seems to dismiss. 

And if Marx’s error of human exceptionalism led to an oversimplification of the causation issue, one could reasonably ponder whether similar arguments can be found with his emphasis on class conflict as the defining paradigm of historical change.  Is class antagonism the obstacle to a more harmonious, just society, or is it merely one aspect of the puzzle? Perhaps even merely one manifestation of more complex factors preceding it?  In short, it seems that we can question whether Marx’s materialism and his particular naturalistic views on history fully and adequately explain the human animal and its troubled condition. The problem isn’t the naturalistic view itself, but Marx’s subjective interpretation of nature, consciousness, and the human condition, which would seem sometimes unsupported by scientific, empirical evidence.

A more accurate analysis, it seems, would give more weight to the fact that humans are an animal that is not so exceptional, recognizing that so-called “civilization” is a condition that is very new to this animal and its fragile psyche.  For most of our history we have roamed the planet like other mammals, traveling in expanded family groups and eating what we can kill or find.  We are an animal whose environment, only in the last few thousand years, a sliver of time, has been completely changed, and in just the last few generations has changed even more, and now we must adjust ourselves to our new conditions or, in the alternative, destroy ourselves and much of the rest of the planet. Are there economic factors at work here?  Of course there are, but to view this situation from a strict economic viewpoint is to miss the bigger picture.  Surely the general goals of cooperation, justice, and social democracy will be more attainable via this wider view of naturalism.